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ASSESSING THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS’ SOCIAL 
VISIBILITY DOCTRINE IN THE CONTEXT OF HUMAN 
TRAFFICKING
KATHLEEN M. MALLON*
INTRODUCTION
United States asylum law provides individuals who have been perse-
cuted in their country of origin with relief in the form of residency in the 
United States. To qualify as a refugee under United States asylum laws, the 
applicant must be unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin 
because of “persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or polit-
ical opinion.”1 This definition has been part of the legal framework for 
almost a century, yet legal scholars still hotly debate its concepts and pa-
rameters. Specifically, the definition of a “particular social group” (“PSG”) 
plagues courts and publicists alike, especially considering the impact the 
chosen definition will have on various claims.
Asylum applicants that do not meet the other four grounds (race, reli-
gion, nationality, or political opinion) must show a well-founded fear of 
persecution because of their individual membership in a PSG. However, 
courts have never explicitly defined that concept, and the circuits are split 
over whether the existence of a particular social group should be measured 
by ‘social visibility’ or shared ‘immutable characteristic.’ The Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) initially adopted an “immutable characteris-
tic” test.2 This test requires an immutable characteristic, one that is un-
changeable or so fundamental to one’s identity as to be unchangeable, and 
a nexus between the shared immutable trait of the social group and the 
persecution, such that the persecutors are motivated by 
the immutable characteristic.3
* J.D. Candidate, May 2014, Chicago-Kent College of Law; B.S., Social Policy & International Studies, 
Northwestern University. 
1. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42) (West 2006). 
2. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 212 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled on other grounds by In re 
Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 441 (B.I.A. 1987).
3. Id. at 211-12.
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This immutable characteristic test proved workable; however, the BIA 
added two additional requirements to the analysis. First, the BIA added 
“social visibility,” which requires that the alleged particular social group be 
viewed as a distinct group by the society from which its members come.4
Second, “particularity” commands that the particular social group be spe-
cifically defined.5 Initially, the BIA viewed these two concepts only as 
factors in its analysis; however, over time, “social visibility” and “particu-
larity” crystallized into requirements. Now, in their absence, the applicant’s 
claim will fail. Only two circuits continue to adhere solely to the “immuta-
ble characteristic” test. The rest have added the BIA’s “social visibility” 
and “particularity” requirements, finding membership in a particu-
lar social group only when the group has characteristics that are recogniza-
ble by others in the members’ native country.6
This widespread acceptance of the social visibility requirement has 
many problematic implications, especially for gender-based asylum claims. 
Gender-based violence remains an area of growing international concern as 
victims of female genital mutilation, forced marriage, honor killings, and 
human trafficking apply in increased numbers for asylum in the United 
States. Victims of gender violence seeking protection under United States 
asylum laws face an upward battle. These women already must show that 
they possess a shared immutable characteristic apart from their gender, and 
as the BIA continues to add mandatory factors to the definition of a PSG, a 
favorable claim becomes increasingly unlikely. This note will focus pri-
marily on victims of human trafficking.
These concerns are multiplied in cases of human trafficking precisely 
because trafficked women are socially invisible, often being transported 
and imprisoned by non-state actors throughout the world. Those who es-
cape and apply for asylum may share common characteristics, or they may 
share only the past experience of having been trafficked. In any event, 
these women do not have distinct characteristics recognizable by others in 
their native country aside from being poor, vulnerable young women. Quite 
the opposite, the social stigma prevalent in many societies often prevents 
previously trafficked women from speaking out about their experiences. In 
this situation, it is nearly impossible for trafficked women to meet the “so-
cial visibility” and “particularity” requirements. However, many women 
who have escaped traffickers do possess a well-founded fear of returning 
4. In re C-A, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 956-57 (B.I.A. 2006), aff’d sub nom., Castillo-Arias v. U.S.
Att’y. Gen., 446 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2006).
5. In re A-M-E, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 76 (B.I.A. 2007).
6. See Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2009).
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to, or remaining inside, their native country because of the likelihood that 
they will be trafficked repeatedly. And time and again, governments have 
shown their inability or unwillingness to fiercely attack this crime, often 
underreporting the prevalence of sex trafficking to preserve their interna-
tional reputations or to continue to reap the financial rewards of sex tour-
ism. In this situation, continuing to use and expand the “social visibility” 
test means that many victims of human trafficking substantively meet the 
requirements for refugee status, and therefore political asylum, but fall 
through the cracks on a technicality, ending in prosecution and deportation.
Human trafficking is a global phenomenon; every country is affected 
by trafficking, whether as a country of origin, transit or destination. But 
despite growing awareness and outreach efforts, the number of sex-
trafficking victims continues to rise. In 2008, 12.3 million individuals iden-
tified themselves as “forced laborers, bonded laborers, or sex-trafficking 
victims.”7 And although the U.N. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children called on national 
and international bodies to devote more resources to its enforcement,8
prosecutions have remained stagnant. Faced with this human rights crisis, 
the United States needs to take a second look at its asylum laws and con-
sider ways to make them more accepting of trafficked women. Immigration 
policies are primarily a function of the receiving countries’ values. The 
United States cannot purport to be actively combatting human trafficking 
while at the same time failing to adequately protect its victims.
Part I of this Note will give an overview of the international and do-
mestic framework surrounding refugee law, analyzing the historical devel-
opment of both the “social visibility” and “immutable characteristic” tests. 
Part II will analyze the circuit split between the “social visibility” and 
“immutable characteristic” tests. Part III will then discuss the implications 
of applying both tests to asylum claims, in particular human trafficking 
applications, and it will conclude that courts should require only the “im-
mutable characteristic” test. To support this conclusion, this Note will illus-
trate how the “immutable characteristic” requirement better aligns with the 
international framework as well as with other countries’ asylum laws, fo-
cusing primarily on the immigration policies of Australia and Canada. Fi-
nally, Part IV will argue that expanding the definition of “social group” to 
include victims of human trafficking, whether by judicial interpretation or 
7. Heather M. Smith, Sex Trafficking: Trends, Challenges, and the Limitations of International 
Law, 12 HUM. RTS. REV. 271, 274 (2011). 
8. U.N. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children, Nov. 15, 2000, 2217 U.N.T.S. 319.
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political amendment, is necessary. This Note will use the United States’ 
1996 Amendment enacted in response to China’s One Child Policy as an 
example of why and how policymakers should take action.
I. INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW AND ITS DOMESTIC FRAMEWORK
This Part presents an overview of international refugee law and the 
corresponding domestic immigration laws in the United States. This over-
view of United States immigration policy will necessarily involve a discus-
sion of United States asylum law and the United States’ legal framework 
for granting refugee status, including the “social group” requirement. After 
discussing the surrounding context, this Part discusses the development of 
the methods courts use to identify a “particular social group” (“PSG”), a 
shared immutable characteristic, or the group’s social visibility and particu-
larity.
A. International Origins
According to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(“Refugee Convention”), a “refugee” is an individual who:
[o]wing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing 
to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that coun-
try; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his 
former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing 
to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.9
This definition provides the foundation for both international and 
United States asylum law. First, the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (“1967 Protocol”) incorporated this definition.10 Since the 1967 
Protocol’s inception, international courts have consistently returned to this 
specific definition in their rulings. Second, Congress codified a virtually 
identical definition into United States domestic law through the Refugee 
Act of 1980.11 Therefore, the definition of a “refugee” in United States 
domestic law derives from these international law origins.12
But despite its long-term usage, the Refugee Convention’s text does 
not define a “social group.” In addition, international courts and jurists 
9. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 
U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
10. 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 
U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol].
11. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42) (West 2006).
12. Id.; see 1967 Protocol, supra note 10, at art. 1; Refugee Convention, supra note 9, at art. 1.
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provide relatively little guidance on what constitutes a PSG. The 2002 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Guidelines (“UNHCR 
Guidelines”) attempt to provide some instruction, informing states that “a 
particular social group is a group of persons who share a common charac-
teristic other than their risk of being persecuted, or who are perceived as a 
group by society.”13 If no protected characteristic exists, the UNHCR 
Guidelines state that, “further analysis should be undertaken to determine 
whether the group is nonetheless perceived as a cognizable group in that 
society.”14 The UNHCR Guidelines do not bind the United States; howev-
er, the U.S. Supreme Court, the BIA, and the circuit courts all consider the 
Guidelines strongly persuasive.15
The UNHCR Guidelines suggest that a PSG must share a “common 
characteristic other than the risk of being persecuted,” suggesting that a 
shared immutable characteristic is enough to create a PSG.16 Only if no 
“protected characteristic” exists does the UNHCR suggest looking into the 
group’s social visibility.17 Therefore, the UNHCR seems to view social 
visibility only as an additional factor that can help establish the PSG, not a 
requirement that operates to preclude its existence. Moreover, the 
UNHCR’s Guidelines on the International Protection for Victims of Traf-
ficking (“Trafficking Guidelines”) state that, in order to constitute a PSG, 
trafficking victims must “either share a common characteristic other than 
their risk of being persecuted or are perceived as a group by society.”18 The 
shared characteristic will often be “innate, unchangeable or otherwise fun-
damental to identity, conscience or the exercise of one’s human rights.”19
The Trafficking Guidelines further stipulate that certain subsets of women 
may constitute PSGs, and that “[f]ormer victims of trafficking may also be 
considered as constituting a social group based on the unchangeable, com-
mon and historic characteristic of having been trafficked.”20 These Guide-
13. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on Int’l Protection: “Membership of a particular 
social group” within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol 
relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002) [hereinafter UNHCR 
Guidelines].
14. Id. at ¶ 13.
15. See I.N.S v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 438-39 n.22 (1987) (noting that “the Handbook 
provides significant guidance in construing the Protocol . . . [and] [i]t has been widely considered useful 
in giving content to the obligations that the Protocol establishes.”).
16. UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 13, at ¶ 29.
17. Id. at ¶¶ 29-31.
18. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on Int’l Protection: The App. of Art. 1A(2) of 
the 1951 Convent. and/or 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees to Victims of Trafficking & 
Pers. at Risk of Being Trafficked, ¶ 37, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/06/07 (Apr. 7, 2006) [hereinafter UNHCR 
Guidelines 2].
19. Id.
20. Id.
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lines confirm the UNHCR’s stance that either a common characteristic or
social visibility can confer PSG status; both conditions need not be present.
B. United States Asylum Law
As discussed in Part IA, the Refugee Act of 1980’s definition of “ref-
ugee” originated in international law. This statute similarly defines a refu-
gee as:
[a]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, 
in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in 
which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling 
to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the 
protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear 
of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion.21
United States courts have generated a plethora of cases interpreting 
this definition. First, to establish “past persecution,” the conduct must rise 
above the level of mere harassment; instead, the conduct must “threaten 
death, imprisonment, or the infliction of substantial harm or suffering.”22 A
finding of past persecution creates a rebuttable presumption that the appli-
cant has a well-founded fear of future persecution.23 Second, the persecu-
tion of the applicant must be caused either by government agents in the 
applicant’s country of origin or by non-state actors in the applicant’s coun-
try of origin that the government is unable or unwilling to control.24
Procedurally, an asylum applicant first brings their claim before an 
Immigration Judge (“IJ”).25 If the IJ denies the applicant asylum, the appli-
cant can appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).26 Only after 
an adverse finding by the BIA will the applicant be allowed to appeal to the 
federal circuit courts.27
On appeal, the Chevron principle commands that the federal circuit
court give due deference to the decisions of the BIA. This principle stems 
from the seminal case Chevron U.S.A. v. National Resource Defense Coun-
cil, Inc.28 In Chevron, the EPA had analyzed the language of the Clean Air 
21. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42) (West 2006).
22. Sharif v. INS, 87 F.3d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 1996).
23. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16 (2009); Milanouic v. Holder, 591 F.3d 566, 569 (7th Cir. 2010).
24. Jonaitiene v. Holder, 660 F.3d 267, 270 (7th Cir. 2011).
25. C.F.R. § 208.14 (1996).
26. C.F.R. § 208.18 (1996).
27. EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGR. REVIEW, DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ASYLUM VARIATIONS IN 
IMMIGRATION COURT FACT SHEET (Nov. 5, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/eo
ir/press/07/AsylumVariationsNov07.pdf.
28. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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Act, and concluded that the Act required specific quality standards.29 On 
appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether the EPA’s interpretation of 
the Clean Air Act was reasonable, and whether it was entitled to any per-
suasive effect.30 In its opinion, the Supreme Court set forth a two-prong test 
for determining when to give deference to an administrative agency’s in-
terpretation.31 First, if Congress has directly spoken on the question at is-
sue, then the court must give effect to Congress’ intent.32 Second, if 
Congress has not spoken, the Court must find that the agency’s interpreta-
tion is reasonable, and only then will the Court be compelled to adopt the 
agency’s interpretation.33 In rationalizing this deference, the Court rea-
soned that Congress had, either explicitly or implicitly, delegated to the 
administrative agency the power to decide the issue by virtue of its statuto-
ry conferral of adjudicative power.34 Therefore, by deferring to the agen-
cy’s interpretation, the court is still effectuating Congressional intent.35
Under the Refugee Act of 1980, United States asylum laws grant pro-
tection to an individual that establishes “refugee” status.36 However, like its 
international counterparts, the Refugee Act of 1980 does not define mem-
bership in a PSG.37 Moreover, very limited legislative history exists to shed 
light on the drafters’ intended meaning of a PSG.38 Absent any Congres-
sional intent, courts must apply the second prong of Chevron deference, 
submitting to the BIA’s construction of a PSG only when the BIA’s inter-
pretation is reasonable.39 The BIA continues to place hurdles in the way of 
individuals attempting to establish refugee status via membership in a PSG, 
such as requiring both “social visibility” and “particularity” in addition to 
29. Id. at 840.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 842-43 (“When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it admin-
isters, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the mat-
ter. . . . If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at 
issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the 
absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to 
the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.”).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. INS v. Cardoza Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 423 (1987).
37. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42) (West 2006).
38. Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1239 (3rd Cir. 1993) (discussing how little legislative history 
exists about what the drafters of the 1980 Refugee Act considered as the definition of social group).
39. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984).
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the traditional “immutable characteristic” test. And in the human traffick-
ing situation, the BIA’s interpretation may no longer be reasonable.
C. Historical Development of the Ways to Define a “Social Group”
As discussed above, neither the international framework nor United 
States statutory law define with particularity what constitutes a PSG. As a 
result, courts faced with an asylum application asserting membership in a 
PSG struggle to interpret this requirement. The BIA and courts throughout 
the country have suggested and applied various tests. This Section provides 
a chronological overview of the BIA and the circuit courts’ various inter-
pretations of what constitutes a PSG.
1. Protected Characteristic Approach
In In re Acosta, the BIA first recognized the protected characteristic 
approach, which states that when individuals share a common immutable 
characteristic, they constitute a PSG.40 In In re Acosta, the BIA rejected the 
asylum applicant’s argument that COTAXI drivers and persons engaged in 
the transportation industry in El Salvador constitute a PSG.41 The court 
used the canon ejusdem generis to conclude that the more general “social 
group” should be construed in a manner consistent with the other, more 
specific words in the enumeration, “race,” “religion,” “nationality,” and 
“political opinion.”42 The court then found that each of those specific 
words describe an immutable characteristic, so “social group” must also 
mean “a group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable charac-
teristic.”43
In addition, In re Acosta explained that an “immutable characteristic” 
can be an innate characteristic, such as sex or race, but it does not have to 
be.44 The BIA instructed that what constitutes an “immutable characteris-
tic” must be determined on a case by case basis; however, “whatever the 
common characteristic that defines the group, it must be one that the mem-
bers of the group either cannot change, or should not be required to change 
because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.”45
Applying this definition, the BIA concluded that Acosta’s membership in 
40. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled on other grounds by In re 
Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 441 (B.I.A. 1987).
41. Id. at 234.
42. Id. at 233.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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COTAXI was not an immutable characteristic. Acosta could change jobs, 
and therefore he could change his membership in the particular group of
threatened taxi drivers.46 Therefore, because its members did not possess 
shared immutable characteristics, COTAXI did not constitute a PSG.
2. Innate Characteristics Test
The Ninth Circuit agreed with In re Acosta’s “immutable characteris-
tic” test, but felt the test was too broad. Therefore, in Sanchez-Trujillo v. 
INS, the Ninth Circuit designed its own “voluntary association” test.47 This 
test required the “existence of a voluntary associational relationship among 
the purported members, which imparts some common characteristic that is 
fundamental to their identity as a member of that discrete social group.”48
Essentially, this test means that a “collection of people closely affiliated 
with each other, who are actuated by some common impulse or interest” 
constitute a PSG.49 While substantially similar to the BIA’s “immutable 
characteristic” test, the Ninth Circuit added the “voluntary relationship” 
language to address the concern that social groups would be based on “de-
mographic distributions.” For example, the court feared that all six-foot-tall 
men would constitute a social group because height is an unchangeable, 
immutable characteristic.50
However, in Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, the Ninth Circuit expanded 
this test, holding that “a ‘particular social group’ is one united by a volun-
tary association, including a former association, or by an innate characteris-
tic that is so fundamental to the identities or consciences of its members 
that members either cannot or should not be required to change it.”51 The 
court then granted the applicant asylum because he would face almost cer-
tain persecution in Mexico because of his sexual orientation.52 This articu-
lation of the voluntary association test suggests that a voluntary association 
is no longer necessary; rather, either a voluntary association or an innate 
characteristic suffices to create a PSG.
46. Id. at 234.
47. 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986).
48. Id. at 1576.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000).
52. Id. at 1099.
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3. Social Visibility and Particularity
In In re C-A, the BIA heightened the requirement for establishing a 
social group. In that case, the BIA considered the definition set out in the 
UNHCR Guidelines, which state that a court can consider social visibility 
in establishing a PSG if the immutable characteristic is not readily appar-
ent.53 From this review, the BIA decided to retain the Acosta immutable 
characteristic definition, but concluded that the social visibility of the al-
leged social group is a relevant factor.54 This social visibility analysis re-
quires that other members of the applicant’s community perceive the 
applicant as a member of a particular social group.55 Applying these stand-
ards to In re C-A, the BIA declared that noncriminal informants do not 
constitute a social group because they are not a recognizable subset of Co-
lumbian society.56 Rather, the very nature of being a confidential informant 
means that an individual is shielded from public view.57 In its reasoning, 
the BIA did not focus on the immutable characteristic of these informants, 
the shared past experience, but rather allowed the group’s lack of social 
visibility to defeat their claim. In so doing, the BIA strongly suggested that 
social visibility is not simply a factor in the analysis, but a requirement.
Similarly, in In re A-M-E, the BIA used yet another requirement to 
justify its rejection of an application for asylum: particularity.58 According 
to the BIA, particularity requires that the social group not be “too amor-
phous” or “indeterminate.”59 In In re A-M-E, the BIA rejected a proposed 
social group of wealthy Guatemalans because “the characteristic of wealth 
or affluence is simply too subjective, inchoate, and variable to provide the 
sole basis for membership in a particular social group.”60 In its opinion, the 
BIA also rejected any circular reasoning, holding that “a social group can-
not be defined exclusively by the fact that its members have been subjected 
to harm.”61 Therefore, this requirement denies the existence of a PSG 
whose members share the common characteristic of having been subjected 
to similar past harms. The refusal to recognize this kind of PSG marks an 
53. In re C-A, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 956-57 (B.I.A. 2006), aff’d sub nom, Castillo-Arias v. U.S.
Att’y. Gen., 446 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2006).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 957.
56. Id. at 960-61.
57. Id. at 960.
58. 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 74, 76 (B.I.A. 2007).
59. Id. at 76.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 74.
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unprecedented heightening of the requirements for attaining refugee status 
based on membership in a social group.
II. CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER THE DEFINITION OF A “PARTICULAR SOCIAL 
GROUP”
Currently, the circuit courts are split over the definition of a PSG, with 
some adhering to the BIA’s current framework, and some rejecting the 
BIA’s added requirements of social visibility and particularity. This Part 
will analyze recent cases from different circuits to illustrate each court’s 
reasoning for their chosen formulation. This Part will also show how the 
circuits produce disparate results depending on their chosen standard. Es-
sentially, courts that apply the additional requirements of “social visibility” 
and “particularity” will often rule against asylum-seekers who would have 
been granted asylum if they had appealed to a court which uses only the 
“immutable characteristics” definition.
A. Circuits that Adopt Social Visibility and Particularity
Most circuit courts defer to the BIA’s analysis, requiring that the PSG 
have social visibility and particularity. The First,62 Second,63 Fourth,64
Sixth,65 Eighth,66 Tenth,67 and Eleventh Circuits68 all require an immutable 
characteristic, as well as social visibility and particularity before recogniz-
ing a PSG. Although these circuits retain the Acosta test, the existence of 
an “immutable characteristic” does not automatically confer status as a 
PSG. For example, in Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Attorney General, the Eleventh 
Circuit found that a PSG encompasses only those individuals who, in addi-
tion to immutability, have social visibility.69 In response, the First, Second, 
Fourth, Sixth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits followed suit, using “social visi-
bility” as a mandatory element of the PSG definition, without which the 
court can reject the applicant’s asylum claim.
62. Scatambuli v. Holder, 558 F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir. 2009).
63. Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007).
64. Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 124 (4th Cir. 2011).
65. Al-Ghorbani v. Holder, 585 F.3d 980, 994 (6th Cir. 2009).
66. Costanza v. Holder, 647 F.3d 749, 753 (8th Cir. 2011).
67. Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 658 F.3d 1222, 1229-33 (10th Cir. 2011).
68. Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Att’y. Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 1196 (11th Cir. 2006).
69. Id. at 1197.
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B. Circuits that Adopt Only Immutable Characteristic
Conversely, the Third and Seventh Circuits refuse to apply social visi-
bility and particularity to their analyses, retaining only the “immutable
characteristics” test. In Gatimi v. Holder, the Seventh Circuit became the 
first court to reject the social visibility doctrine, criticizing its inconsistent 
application within the BIA.70 In Gatimi, a Kenyan national was harassed 
and tortured by members of the political group Mungiki, both on account of 
his defection from the group and his wife’s refusal to undergo female geni-
tal mutilation (“FGM”).71 The Seventh Circuit found that the BIA had 
found similar groups to constitute PSGs both with and without reference to 
their “social visibility.”72 Therefore, because of the BIA’s inconsistent 
application of the “social visibility” requirement, the court refused to defer 
to the BIA’s analysis.73 Essentially, the Seventh Circuit found that “when 
an administrative agency’s decisions are inconsistent, a court cannot pick 
one of the inconsistent lines and defer to that one” without “condon[ing] 
arbitrariness” and “usurp[ing] that agency’s responsibilities.”74
Moreover, writing for the court, Judge Posner attacked the “social vis-
ibility” doctrine itself, asserting that the doctrine does not make any sense, 
and that the BIA has not attempted to explain the reasoning behind its 
mandatory usage.75 Judge Posner found the doctrine illogical because a 
member of a group who is targeted for persecution “will take pains to avoid 
being socially visible.”76 Take, for example, homosexuals in a homophobic 
society, members of a group targeted for assassination, or women that have 
not yet undergone FGM in societies where the practice is common.77 In all 
these cases, “to the extent that the members of the target group are success-
ful in remaining invisible, they will not be ‘seen’ by other people in the 
society ‘as a segment of the population.’”78 Indeed, by requiring the 
Mungiki defectors in this case to become socially visible, the BIA is essen-
tially requiring them to pin “a target to their backs with the legend ‘I am a 
Mungiki defector.’”79
70. 578 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2009).
71. Id. at 614.
72. Id. at 615.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 616.
75. Id. at 615.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 616.
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In response to the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Gatimi, the Third Cir-
cuit also rejected “social visibility” in Valdiviezo-Galdamez.80 In that opin-
ion, the Third Circuit cited extensively from Gatimi, indicating its approval 
of the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning.81 In addition, the Third Circuit specifi-
cally refused to apply the BIA’s “particularity” requirement, finding that 
“social visibility” and “particularity” “appear to be articulations of the 
same concept and the government’s attempt to distinguish the two oscil-
lates between confusion and obfuscation.”82 The Third Circuit then de-
clined to require “particularity” for the same reasons it rejected “social 
visibility.”83 Like the Seventh Circuit in Gatimi, the Third Circuit found 
that the BIA inconsistently applied these tests, making their interpretations 
unreasonable. Therefore, the court refused to provide Chevron deference to 
such unreasonable interpretations.84
C. Innate Characteristic, Voluntary Association, and Chevron Deference
As briefly discussed above, the Ninth Circuit developed its own test, 
which the court only utilizes in the absence of a prior decision by the BIA. 
First, the Ninth Circuit looks at the facts of the case, and if the asserted 
PSG is substantially similar to a social group in a previously decided BIA 
opinion, the court will give the BIA due deference and apply its ruling.85
However, if the alleged social group is not similar to any precedential BIA 
ruling, the court will apply its own two-alternative test.86 Under this test, if 
the applicant can show either voluntary association or a shared innate char-
acteristic, the court will find a PSG.87 The Ninth Circuit has applied this 
two-prong analysis in recent cases. For example, in In S-E-G, the BIA 
found that Salvadoran young adults resisting gang membership did not 
constitute a “social group” because they lacked “social visibility” and “par-
ticularity.”88 In a later case with similar facts, Ramos-Lopez, the Ninth Cir-
cuit considered whether youths resisting gang membership constitute a 
80. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 604 (3d Cir. 2011).
81. Id. at 604-06.
82. Id. at 608.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Santos-Lemus v. Mukasy, 542 F.3d 738, 745-46 (9th Cir. 2008) (determining that Chevron 
deference is due to the BIA’s analysis of the proposed PSG of Guatemalan youths who refuse to join 
gangs based on the BIA’s earlier precedential decision in S-E-G, which rejected those who resist re-
cruiting by a Salvadoran gang as a PSG).
86. Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000).
87. Id.
88. In re S-E-G, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 582-83, 590 (B.I.A. 2008).
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PSG.89 In that situation, the Ninth Circuit found that the BIA intended their 
analysis to apply to similar cases, and applied the BIA’s “social visibility” 
and “particularity” requirements.90 After applying those requirements, the 
Ninth Circuit similarly denied the existence of a PSG.91
III. PROBLEMS WITH SOCIAL VISIBILITY AND PARTICULARITY
After discussing the development of the various definitions of a PSG, 
Part III concludes that the BIA should abandon the added requirements of 
“social visibility” and “particularity.” Instead, retaining only the “immuta-
ble characteristic” test better protects asylum seekers by ensuring that 
courts do not reject deserving claims due to an arguably arbitrary require-
ment. Part III will illustrate the negative consequences for asylum seekers, 
specifically victims of gender violence, if courts retain the BIA’s additional 
requirements of “social visibility” and “particularity.”
A. Problems with “Social Visibility” and “Particularity”
The addition of social visibility and particularity to the PSG analysis 
created many practical problems. First, Chevron deference should not apply 
to the BIA’s construction of a PSG because of the BIA’s inconsistent use of 
social visibility in its past decisions. For this reason, both the Third Circuit 
and the Seventh Circuit found that Chevron deference does not apply when 
defining a PSG. In Gatimi, Judge Posner pointed out that historically the 
BIA “has found groups to be ‘particular social groups’ without reference to 
social visibility, as well as, in this and other cases, refusing to classify so-
cially invisible groups as particular social groups but without repudiating 
the other line of cases.”92 This ambiguity is untenable, and courts should 
hesitate before deferring to such a conflicted body. Instead, before Chevron
deference is appropriate, the BIA must specifically reject its old frame-
work, clarifying any inconsistencies in the law.
Second, social visibility is inherently difficult to apply. At a basic lev-
el, it is incredibly difficult to define public perceptions. Social perception is 
“a subjective process shaped by an individual’s current motivation, emo-
tion, and cognition, as well as his or her more long-standing traits.”93 So-
89. See Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 855 (9th Cir. 2009).
90. Id. at 860-61.
91. Id.
92. Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615-16 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted).
93. Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of “Social Visibility” in Defining a “Particular 
Social Group” and Its Potential Impact on Asylum Claims Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender,
27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47, 73 (2008) (quoting Matthew D. Lieberman & Jennifer H. Pfeifer, The 
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cial perception depends “not only on the identity of the perceiver, but the 
emotional states of the perceiver and the perceived at any given moment, as 
well as the interactions that group members have had in the past.”94 More-
over, just as individuals around the world perceive groups differently, soci-
eties around the world vary widely in their political systems, religions, and 
tolerance of cultural “others.” Put simply, some countries have little toler-
ance for those who are different, and may target specific groups based on 
assumptions and stereotypes. Because of the individualized nature of social 
perception, a test that rests on who the public perceives to constitute a PSG 
opens the door to subjectivity, arbitrariness, and validation of social stereo-
types.
Moreover, it is almost impossible for courts to identify when society 
has confirmed the existence of a PSG. Is a PSG required to attain govern-
ment recognition? Must the BIA conduct an investigation into particular 
subcultures? Why is self-recognition insufficient? Proponents of social 
visibility left these questions largely unanswered, and these gaps will inevi-
tably lead to disparate results because each society views minority groups 
with varying degrees of acceptance. This issue is especially problematic in 
cases where the alleged PSG is one whose members wish to remain invisi-
ble to the rest of society, but who must become visible in order to be rec-
ognized as a PSG. That example shows that a definition entirely dependent 
on social visibility will inevitably lead to distorted outcomes, often failing 
to grant asylum to members of groups that need protection the most.
Conversely, requiring only a shared “immutable characteristic” is 
much easier to apply, and this rule can be defined through traditional prin-
ciples of interpretation. An “immutable characteristic” is one that is innate 
and unchangeable, or so fundamentally important to one’s identity that the 
individual should not be required to change it.95 Rather than forcing courts 
to accept other societies’ judgments on whether a group constitutes a PSG, 
this standard places the power to decide what characteristics are “immuta-
ble” with courts. And when that threshold is met, the absence of visibility 
in the applicant’s native country should not preclude that individual from 
attaining refugee status. Relying primarily on “social visibility” leads not 
only to arbitrary results, but it also often culminates in the United States 
returning deserving applicants to countries where they will almost certainly 
face persecution.
Self and Social Perception: Three Kinds of Questions in Social Cognitive Neuroscience, in THE
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR 195, 195 (Alexander Easton & Nathan J. Emery 
eds., 2005)).
94. Id. at 72.
95. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).
1184 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 89:3
B. Problems with Social Visibility and Particularity Specific to Victims of 
Human Trafficking
The BIA’s social visibility requirement particularly burdens victims of 
human trafficking. First, trafficked individuals already struggle to establish 
a shared immutable characteristic, let alone additional elements. For exam-
ple, the UNHCR96 and some other nations97 recognize that gender compris-
es at least an important factor in finding a PSG, if gender is not a PSG in 
and of itself. However, in United States courts, a PSG of “women” is not 
accepted, and trafficked women must construct a narrower PSG based on 
their uniting characteristics. These characteristics—shared past experience, 
marital status, socioeconomic class, lower educational levels, or lack of a 
familial support system—do not always succeed. For this reason, commen-
tators such as Martina Pomeroy argue that in societies where “women as a 
group are perceived as inferior,” gender can create a PSG. In these cases, 
“it is not the form of persecution directed at them in their particular society 
that defines their group; it is the fact that, as women, they are perceived as 
inferior, which then invites persecution upon any one of them[.]”98 Ac-
ceptance of this norm would greatly aid trafficked women because coun-
tries where women are perceived as inferior often correspond with 
countries plagued by sex trafficking.
Second, trafficked individuals will very rarely meet the social visibil-
ity and particularity requirements. As Judge Posner reasoned in Gatimi,
requiring that a social group be “visible” is counter-intuitive because the 
persecuted social group will “take pains to avoid being socially visible[.]”99
Essentially, the “social visibility” standard makes the false assumption that 
women across the world are socially visible. While women in the United 
States and other developed countries have almost attained gender equality, 
women within other regions of the world remain politically voiceless and 
removed from the public sphere. A great percentage of the women who 
seek asylum in the United States are fleeing from these countries. There-
fore, it does not make sense to grant these women asylum because of their 
“social visibility”; in fact, requiring social visibility actually contributes to 
a large gender gap in United States asylum law.
96. UNHCR Guidelines 2, supra note 18, at ¶ 38.
97. See, e.g., Regina v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, [1999] 2 A.C. 629 (H.L.) (appeal taken 
from Eng.) (U.K.); MIMA v. Khawar (2002) 210 CLR 1 (Austl.).
98. Martina Pomeroy, Left out in the Cold: Trafficking Victims, Gender, and Misinterpretation of 
the Refugee Convention, MICH. J. GENDER & L., 454, 468 (2010).
99. Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009).
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This problem is especially apparent in cases of human trafficking be-
cause trafficked women, or those at risk of being trafficked, constitute an 
extremely vulnerable population. These women are usually poor and uned-
ucated, and thus particularly susceptible to traffickers that promise legiti-
mate jobs. These women often voluntarily travel with sex traffickers to 
third-world countries, not realizing that no legitimate job exists until they 
are forced into prostitution. At this point, trafficked women become invisi-
ble; they are smuggled to different countries and kept as property with little 
to no human rights. For those who escape, the social stigma prevalent in 
many societies often causes them to hide their experience. With such an 
invisible crime, how can its victims possibly become socially visible? 
Therefore, when courts adopt a social visibility requirement, they essential-
ly erase any likelihood that victims of human trafficking will obtain a legal 
remedy in the United States.
Third, cementing social visibility and particularity into the definition 
of a PSG would overrule many stable precedents decided before the BIA’s 
imposition of social visibility and particularity.100 This overhaul would 
invalidate cases finding that persons opposed to FGM101 and LGBT102 in-
dividuals constitute members of a PSG. Those cases would fail under a 
social visibility test because the cases include two areas where the asylum 
applicant would reasonably attempt to hide his or her immutable character-
istic—her sexual orientation or her failure to undergo FGM—in order to 
evade persecution. Therefore, according to Nitzan Sternerg, the use of so-
cial visibility will “harm the ability of asylum applicants to obtain asylum 
on the ground of a PSG based on opposition to FGM, a PSG of Cuban ho-
mosexuals, and PSG based on [a] past experience,” all individuals our soci-
ety has decided are deserving of asylum.103 If these narrower claims fail, 
little chance exists that courts will recognize a PSG based on its members’ 
shared risk of being trafficked or past trafficking experience.
IV. WHY COURTS SHOULD ADOPT THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S IMMUTABLE 
CHARACTERISTIC STANDARD
After discussing the reasons why social visibility and particularity 
should be abandoned, Part IV advocates that courts retain only the immuta-
100. Marouf, supra note 93, at 78-102.
101. See In re Fauziya Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 358, 365 (B.I.A. 1996) (holding that young Togo-
lese women who have not had FGM and who oppose the practice constitute a PSG).
102. See In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 820-23 (B.I.A. 1994) (holding that homosex-
uals known to the Cuban government constitute a PSG).
103. Nitzan Sternberg, Do I Need to Pin a Target to my Back?: The Definition of “Particular 
Social Group” in U.S. Asylum Law, FORD. L. J. 245, 284-86 (2011).
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ble characteristic standard. This test protects both the asylum applicant and 
the receiving state by retaining a narrow definition of a PSG that will not 
overburden the immigration system. Part IV will show how “immutable 
characteristic” fits within the international law framework, and aligns well 
with United States values. Part IV will then conclude by comparing the 
United States’ 1996 Amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act, 
which granted asylum to Chinese individuals opposed to China’s One 
Child Policy, to this situation. This comparison shows that even a broad 
definition of PSG will not overburden the United States’ immigration sys-
tem, or, alternatively, that the United States could pass a similar amend-
ment here to specifically protect trafficked individuals.
A. Immutable Characteristic Standard in Line with the International 
Framework
International law requires only an immutable characteristic standard. 
As previously discussed, the 1951 Refugee Convention does not define 
“membership in a particular social group.”104 However, the UNHCR 
Guidelines provide that “a particular social group is a group of persons who 
share a common characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted, or 
who are perceived as a group by society.”105 This language implies that 
either a shared immutable characteristic, or the group’s social visibility, 
defines the PSG, but neither test operates to the exclusion of the other. 
Only if no protected (immutable) characteristic exists should “further anal-
ysis . . . be undertaken to determine whether the group is nonetheless per-
ceived as a cognizable group in that society.”106 In this way, international 
law uses social visibility as an alternative when an immutable characteristic 
is not readily identifiable, but does not allow the lack of social visibility to 
defeat a claim.107
Moreover, the UNHCR Guidelines note that a “proper interpretation 
[of PSG] must be consistent with the object and purpose of the Conven-
tion,” which is to provide protection for specific groups targeted for perse-
cution.108 Adding social visibility and particularity as prerequisites to the 
establishment of a PSG is counterintuitive to the Convention’s stated goals. 
Admittedly, the drafters of the Refugee Convention did not intend PSG as a 
“catch-all” provision. However, they also did not intend to render the defi-
104. Refugee Convention, supra note 9, at art. 1.
105. UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 13, at ¶ 11.
106. Id. at ¶ 13.
107. Id.
108. Id. at ¶ 2.
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nition of a PSG completely dependent on the persecuting society. Rather, 
the UNHCR Guidelines posit that membership in a PSG “should be read in 
an evolutionary manner, open to the diverse and changing nature of groups 
in various societies and evolving international human rights norms.”109
Social visibility does not allow for this diverse and changing nature of 
groups, as it is completely dependent on societies’ viewpoint, which may 
remain static on certain issues. For these reasons, retaining only an immu-
table characteristic approach will better adhere to the traditional aims and 
contemporary confines of international law.
B. Response to China’s One Child Policy
Countries align their immigration policies with their own value sys-
tems by tailoring their refugee laws in response to world events. The re-
sponse of the United States to the Chinese government’s One Child Policy 
is indicative of this hypothesis. 
In the late 1970’s, the Chinese government instituted a one-child poli-
cy, restricting Chinese families from having more than one child in order to 
control China’s rapidly growing population.110 The government severely 
punished those who disobeyed with forced abortions, imprisonment, infan-
ticide, or violence.111 In some cases, officials allowed the woman to carry 
the fetus to term, but forcibly sterilized her after the birth of the child.112 In 
response, some Chinese nationals fled the country, applying for political 
asylum in countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
Australia. However, fleeing a coercive family planning program does not 
explicitly fall within one of the five grounds necessary to attain refugee 
status. Therefore, applicants typically argued persecution because of 
“membership in a particular social group,” with varying degrees of success.
Many states refused to grant these Chinese applicants asylum based on 
persecution because of a PSG.113 For example, in Applicant A. v. Minister 
of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, the Australian High Court recognized 
that “[n]ot only is it impossible to define the phrase [PSG] exhaustively, it 
is pointless to attempt to do so.”114 Nevertheless, the Court held that a so-
cial group must share a “common attribute and a societal perception that 
109. Id. at ¶ 3.
110. Sean T. Masson, Note, Cracking Open the Golden Door: Revisiting U.S. Asylum Law’s
Response to China’s One-Child Policy, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1135, 1136-37 (2009).
111. Id. at 1138.
112. Id.
113. See Applicant A v. Minister of Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225, 241, 265-
66 (Austl.).
114. Id. at 258.
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they stand apart.”115 More important than any innate characteristic, “the 
existence of such a group depends in most, perhaps all, cases on external 
perceptions of the group.”116 Utilizing this standard, the Australian High 
Court found that asylum seekers from China, although possessing a well-
founded fear of persecution because of a risk of forced sterilization, did not 
receive refugee status.117 The Court refused to consider these individuals 
members of a PSG, instead defining them as a collection of persons in Chi-
na who objected to a general social policy.118
In Applicant A, Australia used its version of social visibility to reject 
Chinese nationals opposed to China’s One Child Policy. This example 
shows how social visibility operates to disqualify individuals deserving of 
asylum, and illustrates social visibility’s incompatibility with the United 
States’ refugee law framework. Essentially, at the same time that many 
Chinese nationals began to flee China, the BIA and most circuit courts had 
confirmed that social visibility and particularity were required. The United 
States recognized that this specific group of individuals did not constitute a 
PSG because they lacked social visibility, and would typically not fulfill 
the nexus requirement “on account of . . . political opinion.”119 However, 
the United States felt compelled to grant asylum to these individuals be-
cause of the certain human rights abuses these individuals would face if 
returned to China. Therefore, Congress amended the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act to include individuals fleeing forced sterilization, identifying 
forced sterilization in this context as persecution on account of political 
opinion.120
Similarly, even before the 1996 Amendment, the BIA granted Chinese 
nationals asylum while remaining silent on how these applicants fit within 
the traditional terms of the refugee definition.121 In In re C-Y-Z, a Chinese 
national sought asylum based on his family’s opposition to China’s coer-
cive family planning program.122 When the applicant’s wife became preg-
nant with their second child, the government ordered her to have an 
abortion, but she escaped into hiding and had the child.123 The family only 
had to pay a fine as punishment, but after the birth of the couple’s third 
115. Id. at 262.
116. Id. at 261.
117. Id. at 263-65.
118. Id. at 287.
119. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, § 601(a)(1), 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006)).
120. Id.
121. In re C-Y-Z, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 915 (B.I.A. 1997).
122. Id. at 915-16.
123. Id.
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child, the government forcibly sterilized the applicant’s wife.124 The BIA 
felt the claim deserving of asylum, but the claim did not fit within the cur-
rent definition of a refugee. In that case, the BIA still granted the applicant 
and his family asylum, but did not provide any specific reasoning why in 
terms of the refugee definition.125
Both of these strategies exemplify how the United States can structure 
and interpret its asylum laws to meet the needs of the world’s refugees. The 
BIA itself recognized the flaws inherent in its “social visibility” standard 
when faced with a Chinese national’s application that it considered deserv-
ing of asylum, but knew did not possess “social visibility.” In that instance, 
unlike the Australian High Court, the BIA simply ignored its previous deci-
sions and granted the applicant asylum without specifically articulating 
why. While this author commends the BIA for doing so, the BIA should 
not continue to promulgate a standard that it itself deviates from when it 
subjectively views the application as deserving of asylum. This practice 
will only lead to arbitrary and inconsistent results, and allows the BIA and 
courts to insert an intolerable amount of subjectivity into the law. Instead, 
the BIA should recognize that “social visibility” is inapplicable not just in 
some situations, but all, and the BIA should abandon the requirement alto-
gether.
Alternatively, if the United States is willing to bend their asylum laws 
for those in opposition to China’s One Child Policy, a similar framework 
should exist for gender-based asylum claims of similar magnitude, such as 
victims of human trafficking. Forced prostitution and sex trafficking consti-
tute grave violations of human rights. The international community has 
become increasingly aware and concerned about their rise, calling on all 
countries to help combat this modern day slavery. Protecting trafficking 
victims is a crucial piece of eradicating this transnational crime. Therefore, 
a similar amendment protecting victims of human trafficking would illus-
trate that the United States is serious about stopping human trafficking, and 
the amendment would help alleviate the concerns that trafficking victims
will not be able to meet the BIA’s requirements of social visibility and 
particularity.
C. Why the Courts Need to Address This Issue
The United States receives thousands of asylum applications a year. In 
2011, the United States received the second highest amount of applications 
124. Id.
125. Id. at 919-20.
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in the world, and courts granted asylum to around 66% of those applica-
tions.126 The high number of individuals seeking asylum in the United 
States indicates how important a stable, predictable immigration system is 
to the world’s refugee population. However, right now, the United States’ 
immigration system is vague and unworkable with two competing stand-
ards. Without Supreme Court resolution, an asylum seeker in the Third or 
Seventh Circuit will automatically have a much higher chance of enjoying 
asylum than his or her counterpart in the rest of the country. A well-
functioning legal system does not support such arbitrary results. Therefore, 
it is imperative that the Supreme Court resolves this split among the cir-
cuits, and takes into account the detrimental effect on asylum seekers if the 
social visibility and particularity requirements remain.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Supreme Court should resolve the circuit split be-
tween the “social visibility” test and “immutable characteristic” test in fa-
vor of the “immutable characteristic” standard. Requiring social visibility 
and particularity marks an unprecedented heightening of United States 
asylum law, and courts should either abandon these standards or relegate 
them to less impactful factors These standards cannot remain implemented 
because they negatively affect gender-related claims and help to create a 
gender gap in United States’ asylum law. Instead, the “immutable charac-
teristic” test better comports with the international framework and overall 
purpose of the refugee protection regime. Moreover, “immutable character-
istic” adequately protects both asylum seekers and receiving countries. This 
standard ensures that the United States does not return an individual with a 
well-founded fear of persecution to the state provoking that fear, at the 
same time assuaging the concerns of the receiving country that its immigra-
tion system will not be overwhelmed.
126. See EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FY 2011 STATISTICAL 
YEAR BOOK (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy11syb.pdf.
